Put a Sock(et) in it!

Understanding and Attacking Sockets on Android



Jake Valletta April 16, 2016

Who Am I

- Senior Consultant at Mandiant
- Mobile security researcher
- Beer drinker
- @jake_valletta





Agenda

- Introduction to Sockets
- IPC and Sockets on Android
- Attacking Android Sockets
- Questions



What's a Socket?



Sockets are...

- A mechanism for Inter Process Communication (IPC)
 - Across a network
 - On a local system
- Typically bi-directional
- Foundational to the Internet and modern operating systems





Why do we Care?

- Sockets are used by critical components of the Android operating system
 - OEMs don't always do things correctly
- Sockets routinely lead to security vulnerabilities on Android Devices
 - CVE-2011-1823: vold accepted AF_NETLINK connections from arbitrary processes
 - "weaksauce": Exposed /dev/socket/dmagent AF_UNIX socket can root HTC phones
 - /dev/socket/fotabinder (LG), /dev/socket/init_runit, …



Using Sockets

- APIs exist for most programming languages
 - Python ("socket" module)
 - Java ("java.net.*" classes)
 - Go ("net" package)
 - Perl ("IO::Socket::*" module)
- All roads lead to Rome system calls
 - <sys/socket.h>



Socket System Calls (Server)

- socket(...)
 - return file descriptor
 - domain, type, and protocol arguments
- bind(...)
 - Associate file descriptor with PID/IP/port/file (depends!)
- listen(...)
 - Indicate listening for connection on socket file descriptor
- accept(...) (Blocking!)
 - Accept connections from socket file descriptor
 - Returns new client connection file descriptor



Socket System Calls (Client)

- socket(...)
 - return file descriptor
 - domain, type, and protocol arguments
- bind(...)
 - Associate file descriptor with PID/IP/port/file (depends!)
- connect(...)
 - Connect socket file descriptor to supplied socket IP/port/file
 - Not always required



Socket System Calls (Data Transfer)

- Sending data:
 - send(...) / sendto(...) / sendmsg(...) / write(...)
- Receiving data:
 - recv(...) / recvfrom(...) / recvmsg(...) / read(...)



Socket Domains

- Maintained by kernel
 include/linux/socket.h
- AF_INET + AF_INET6
- AF_UNIX (also called AF_LOCAL)
- AF_NETLINK



. . .

Socket Types

- Maintained by kernel
 - include/linux/net.h
- SOCK_STREAM (e.g. "TCP")
 - Sequential, reliable, two-way, connection-based
- SOCK_DGRAM (e.g. "UDP")
 - connectionless, unreliable
- SOCK_SEQPACKET
 - Sequential, reliable, two-way, connection-based, fixed-max length
- SOCK_RAW
 - "you're on your own"



Socket Domain: AF_INET + AF_INET6

- Internet Protocol (IP) sockets
 - Designed to traverse networks
- What most people simply call "sockets"
- "bind()" call expects IP address and port
- Types: SOCK_STREAM for TCP, SOCK_DGRAM for UDP

import socket

Socket Domain: AF_UNIX

- UNIX domain sockets (UDS)
 - Local only
 - More lightweight than AF_INET
 - process <-> process
- "bind()" call expects socket-type filename or abstract name
 Abstract always starts with null byte (`\0')
- Types: SOCK_STREAM, SOCK_DGRAM, SOCK_SEQPACKET



Socket Domain: AF_UNIX

File UNIX Socket

import socket

```
sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX,
socket.SOCK_STREAM)
```

sock.connect("/dev/socket/silly")

try:

```
message = 'Hi. I am a silly UNIX socket.'
sock.send(message)
finally:
   sock.close()
```



Abstract UNIX Socket

import socket

sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)

sock.connect("\0very_silly")

```
try:
```

message = 'Hi. I am a silly abstract-UNIX socket.'
sock.send(message)
finally:
 sock.close()

Note the 0

Socket Domain: AF_NETLINK

- Communication between kernel and user space
- "bind()" call expects PID and netlink group
 - Groups are maintained by kernel
 - include/uapi/linux/netlink.h
- Types: SOCK_DGRAM, SOCK_RAW (doesn't actually matter)
 import socket

https://www.thecobraden.com

```
ESIDES
NASHVILLE
```

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Sockets on Android



IPC on Android

- Android is built on Linux kernel so...
 - Sockets, FIFO, pipes, ioctl, system calls, shared memory
- Android also provides Binder/Intents for doing IPC between applications
 - Primary app <-> app IPC mechanism
 - Java and Java Native Interface (JNI)



Non-Application Socket IPC

- AF_UNIX sockets
 - App <-> native daemons
 - /dev/socket/*
- AF_NETLINK sockets
 - Native daemon <-> kernel
 - /system/bin/vold
- AF_INET sockets
 - Others...?
 - ...but why?



Finding Sockets

- Kernel maintains lists of sockets in /proc/net/ directory
- Formats are not easy to parse
- '/system/bin/netstat' utility parses these files but...
 - Android uses a stripped down version of netstat

06:21:	38 ~\$ adb she	ll cat /proc/ne	et/i	tcp												
sl	local address	rem address	st	tx queue	rx queue	tr tm->when	retrnsmt	uid	timeout	inode						
0:	0100007F:13AD	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	0A	00000000000	00000000	00:00000000	00000000	0	0	1837	1	00000000	100	00	10	-1
1:	00000000:15B3	00000000:00000	ΘA	000000000:	000000000	00:00000000	000000000	0	0	1841	1	00000000	100	00	10	-1
2:	0F02000A:15B3	0202000A:D48E	01	000000000:	000000000	00:00000000	000000000	0	0	1842	3	00000000	21	4 29	10	-1
06:21	40 ~\$															



Finding Sockets (cont.)

- Solution #1: Compile your own `netstat`
 - Meh.
- Solution #2: Upload `busybox` binary
 - <u>https://busybox.net/downloads/binaries/latest/</u>

06:32:32 ~\$ wget https://busybox.net/downloads/binaries/latest/busybox-armv7l -q 06:32:43 ~\$ adb push busybox-armv7l /data/local/busybox 1207 KB/s (1109128 bytes in 0.896s) 06:32:56 ~\$ adb shell chmod 775 /data/local/busybox 06:33:06 ~\$ adb shell /data/local/busybox netstat -h netstat: invalid option -- h BusyBox v1.21.1 (2013-07-08 10:26:30 CDT) multi-call binary.

Usage: netstat [-ral] [-tuwx] [-enWp]



06:34:47 ~\$ a Active Inter	adb shel net conn	l /data/local/busybox ne ections (only servers)	tstat -lt	
Proto Recv-Q	Send-Q	Local Address	Foreign Address	State
tcp 0	0	localhost:5037	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN
tcp 0	0	0.0.0.0:5555	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN

Finding Sockets (cont.)

- Flags, flags, flags
 - -I Listening sockets
 - -t TCP sockets
 - -u UDP sockets
 - -x UNIX sockets
 - -e Extra information
 - p Print process ID and program name (only if you have permission!)



Finding Sockets: AF_INET

• busybox netstat -pletu

07:17:	45 ~\$ adb	she	ll /data/local/bus	ybox netstat -pletu		
Active	e Internet	conr	nections (only ser	vers)		
Proto	Recv-Q Sen	id-Q	Local Address	Foreign Address	s State	PID/Program name
tcp	Θ	0	localhost:5037	0.0.0:*	LISTEN	66/adbd
tcp	Θ	0	0.0.0.0:5555	0.0.0:*	LISTEN	66/adbd
tcp	Θ	0	:::9999	· · · *	LISTEN	11471/busybox



Finding Sockets: AF_UNIX

• busybox netstat -plex

07:08	:17 ~ \$ a	adb sh	ell /da	ata/local/b	usybox netstat	-plex		
Active	e UNIX (domain	socke	ts (only se	rvers)	•		
Proto	RefCnt	Flags		Туре	State	I-Node	PID/Program name	Path
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1838	66/adbd	@jdwp-control
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	4085	1053/com.jakev.loca	@silly_unix
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	4833	1615/com.android.br	<pre>@webview_devtools_remote_1615</pre>
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1655	1/init	/dev/socket/property_service
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1683	51/vold	/dev/socket/vold
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1866	54/debuggerd	<pre>@android:debuggerd</pre>
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1699	57/zygote	/dev/socket/zygote
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1721	55/rild	/dev/socket/rild-debug
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	2517	355/system_server	/data/system/ndebugsocket
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1724	55/rild	/dev/socket/rild
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1736	53/netd	/dev/socket/mdns
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1739	53/netd	/dev/socket/dnsproxyd
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1741	53/netd	/dev/socket/netd
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1748	60/installd	/dev/socket/installd
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1784	62/qemud	/dev/socket/qemud



Finding Sockets: AF_UNIX

• busybox netstat -plex

07.08	17¢	adb	cho	11 /d	ata/local/h	ucybox notstat	nlov		
07.00	,⊥/~⊅ - INITV	auu) SHE	/ud		usybux netstat	-prex		
ACTIV	e UNIX	aom	ain	SOCKE	ts (only se	rvers)			
Proto	RefCnt	F۱	.ags		Туре	State	I-Node	PID/Program name	Path
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1838	66/adbd	<u>@idwp-control</u>
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	4085	1053/com.jakev.loca	@silly_unix
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	4833	1615/com.android.b	<pre>@webview_devtools_remote_1615</pre>
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1655	1/init	/dev/socket/property_service
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1683	51/vold	/dev/socket/vold
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1866	54/debuggerd	<pre>@android:debuggerd</pre>
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1699	57/zygote	/dev/socket/zygote
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1721	55/rild	/dev/sock_t/rild-debug
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	2517	355/system_server	/data/system/ndebugsocket
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1724	55/ril/	/dev/socket/rild
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1736	53/netd	/dev/socket/mdns
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1739	53/netd	/dev/spcket/dnsproxyd
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1741	53/netd	/dev/gocket/netd
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1748	60/installd	/dev/socket/installd
unix	2]_	ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1754	62/qemud	/dev/socket/qemud

Abstract contains '@'



File shows path

Finding Sockets: AF_NETLINK

- busybox's netstat doesn't parse AF_NETLINK
- You'll need to parse /proc/net/netlink file
 - (more on this later)



Connecting to Sockets

- Method #1: `adb` forwarding
 - Allows tcp, localabstract, localfilesystem, and more!
 - Write a Python client that talks to forwarded or use `nc`

```
07:58:21 ~$ adb forward tcp:9999 tcp:9999
07:58:42 ~$ telnet 127.0.0.1 9999
Trying 127.0.0.1...
Connected to 127.0.0.1.
Escape character is '^]'.
root@generic:/ #
```



- Method #2: Compile and upload `socat`
 - Super flexible command-line utility
 - TCP, TCPv6, UDP, UDPv6, UNIX (file + abstract)
 - <u>http://core.nctritech.com/do/socat-arm-static</u> (WARNING Not mine!)



- Method #3: Create a Java application
 - Public "LocalSocket" and "LocalSocketAddress" classes (UNIX)
 - Non-Public "NativeDaemonConnector" class (UNIX)
 - Public "Socket" class (INET)

LocalSocket sender = new LocalSocket(); sender.connect(new LocalSocketAddress("silly_unix")); sender.getOutputStream().write("Let's send a silly message".getBytes()); sender.getOutputStream().close();

mConnector = new NativeDaemonConnector(

new NetdCallbackReceiver(), "netd", 10, NETD_TAG, 160);



- Method #3: Create a Java application
 - Public "LocalSocket" and "LocalSocketAddress" classes (UNIX)
 - Non-Public "NativeDaemonConnector" class (UNIX)
 - Public "Socket" class (INET)

Abstract UNIX

'/dev/socket/netd' UNIX



- Method #4: Create a C/C++ program
 - Slowest method, but also most powerful
 - Works with all types of sockets, including AF_NETLINK



Attacking Android Sockets



Device Testing Framework

- Modular framework for testing Android devices
 - <u>https://github.com/jakev/dtf</u>
 - <u>https://github.com/jakev/dtfmods-core</u>
- Modules for data collection and processing
- Modules for determining potential security flaws



07:49:05 ~\$ dtf	-h
Android Device	Testing Framework (dtf) v1.3.1-dev
Usage: dtf [modu	ule command] <arguments></arguments>
Built-in Comr	nands:
archive	Archive your dtf project files.
client	Install/remove the dtf client.
help	Prints this help screen.
init	Initializes a project.
local	Display all local modules.
pm	The dtf package manager.
prop	The dtf property manager.
reset	Removes the dtf config from current directory.
source	Used for sourcing additional commands.
status	Determine if project device is attached.

Who is Listening?

- Java applications
 - AF_INET
 - AF_UNIX
- Native binaries ("daemons")
 - AF_INET
 - AF_UNIX
 - AF_NETLINK
- The kernel
 - AF_NETLINK



- Uncommon..
 - Why would you want an application to listen on a socket locally anyways?

08:48:5	6 /x\$ dt	<pre>f_busybox netstat -pletu</pre>			
netstat	: showin	g only processes with yo	ur user ID		
Active	Internet	connections (only serve	ers)		
Proto R	lecv-Q Se	nd-Q Local Address	Foreign Address	State	PID/Program name
tcp	Θ	0 0.0.0.0:1668	0.0.0:*	LISTEN	-
tcp	0	0 localhost:5037	0.0.0:*	LISTEN	

• ...but still happens!



- Determining who is listening can be a challenge*
- Searching in Java applications:
 - grep application DEX for ServerSocket, or use dtf 'dexsearch'



- Reverse application and determine protocol



* Without root privileges

- Searching in native binaries:
 - Determine running processes
 - adb shell ps
 - Pull binaries from "/(vendor|system)/(s|x)?bin/.*"
 - adb pull ...
 - Look for "socket", "bind", "listen", "accept" dynamic symbols
 - nm –D ...
 - Reverse binary to determine domain/type and bind parameters
 - Radare2, IDA Pro



turbohacker.sh





- Use 'adb forward' with `nc` to interact with TCP socket
- Use `socat` on device to interact with UDP socket
- Pro-tip: Always check the logs with `adb logcat`



10:50:23 /\$ adb logcat|grep 3046
E/storeintenttranslate(3046): Error: Only support GET! "asdfasdf"



- UNIX sockets are very common and easy to search
 - Especially abstract!

09:59	9:00	/DevTesting/:	📫 📑 dtf	busybox netstat	-plex grep \@	
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	10936 -	<pre>@FactorySettingsService</pre>
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	10762 -	<pre>@shbattlog_sock</pre>
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	119907 -	<pre>@jdwp-control</pre>
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	10795 -	<pre>@shdisp_process</pre>
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	10981 -	<pre>@time_genoff</pre>
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	10726 -	<pre>@android:debuggerd</pre>
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	10817 -	@THERMALE_UI
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	10761 -	<pre>@shbatt_dev_sock</pre>
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1747293 -	<pre>@chrome_devtools_remote</pre>
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	17378 -	<pre>@slate_comm_path</pre>
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	11974 -	<pre>@SH_THERMALD_UI</pre>

 Ask yourself – Is this socket part of the AOSP, or OEM added?



- UNIX sockets are very common and easy to search
 - Especially abstract!

09:59	00:00	/DevTesting/	📫 📑 dtf	busybox netstat	-plex grep	\@	
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	10936 -		<pre>@FactorySettingsService</pre>
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	10762 -		<pre>@shbattlog sock</pre>
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	119907 -		<pre>@jdwp-control</pre>
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	10795 -		<pre>@shdisp process</pre>
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	10281 ded	by OFM	<pre>@time_genoff</pre>
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	10726 -		<pre>@android:debuggerd</pre>
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	10817 -		@THERMALE_UI
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	10761 -		<pre>@shbatt_dev_sock</pre>
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	1747293 -		<pre>@chrome_devtools_remote</pre>
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	17378 -		<pre>@slate_comm_path</pre>
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENING	11974 -		@SH_THERMALD_UI

 Ask yourself – Is this socket part of the AOSP, or OEM added?



- Searching in Java applications:
 - Use grep or "dexsearch" module

10:39:21 /DevTesting/ \$ dtf dexsearch s FactorySettingsService Matches in applications: Matches in frameworks: Match(es) in jp.co.sharp.android.factorysettings.db FactorySettingsService 10:39:39 /DevTesting/ \$ grep -rl FactorySettingsService \ > unframework/jp.co.sharp.android.factorysettings/ unframework/jp.co.sharp.android.factorysettings/jp/co/sharp/android/factorysettings/Ipc.smali 10:39:56 /DevTesting/

- Searching in native binaries:
 - Use one-liner from previous slide



- Use `adb forward' or `socat`
- Pro-tip: Always check the logs with `adb logcat`



- Most difficult to trace and replicate
 - Could have a whole presentation on netlink sockets alone $\ensuremath{\textcircled{\sc o}}$
- Parsing "/proc/net/netlink" contains netlink group and PID





- Determine group mappings from kernel source
 - Usually in "include/uapi/linux/netlink.h", but doesn't have to be
- Review netlink documentation on group protocol format

11:46:56 /DevTesting/Note\$ dtf socklist --filter netlink|grep auditd
/system/bin/auditd group=9 PID=1358

<pre>tf #define NETLINK_SELINUX 7 /* SELinux event notifications */ th #define NETLINK_ISCS1 8 /* Open-iSCSI */</pre>
#define NETLINK ISCS1 8 /* Open-iSCSI */
#define NEILINK AUDI 9 /* auditing */
<pre>#define NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP 10</pre>
#define NETLINK_CONNECTOR 11
<pre>#define NETLINK_NETFILTER 12 /* netfilter subsystem */</pre>
#define NETLINK_IP6_FW 13
<pre>#define NETLINK_DNRTMSG 14 /* DECnet routing messages */</pre>
<pre>#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT 15 /* Kernel messages to userspace */</pre>



- Determine format of netlink messages and permission checks from kernel source
 - "netlink_kernel_create(...)" kernel function to create netlink sockets in kernel

drivers/misc/qseecom.c



- User space netlink sockets will use "socket()/bind()" but not "listen()/accept()"
 - "bind()" might not be used, depending on group/protocol



Conclusions



In conclusion...

- Sockets are an important component of Android platform security
 - AF_INET, AF_UNIX, and AF_NETLINK are the most common forms of sockets used on Android
- Sockets can be enumerated, fuzzed, and researched mostly without a rooted device
- Unprotected sockets can be used to interact with the kernel, privileged applications, or native binaries



Questions? Comments?



Contact Me!

- GitHub: <u>https://github.com/jakev/</u>
- Blog: http://blog.thecobraden.com
- Website: https://www.thecobraden.com/
- Twitter: @jake_valletta
- Email: javallet@gmail.com



The End

Thanks!

